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Abstract
To assess the presence of gerrymandering, one can consider the shapes of districts or
the distribution of votes. The efficiency gap, which does the latter, plays a central role in
a 2016 federal court case on the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s state legislative district
plan. Unfortunately, however, the efficiency gap reduces to proportional representation, an
expectation that is not a constitutional right. We present a new measure of partisan asym-
metry that does not rely on the shapes of districts, is simple to compute, is provably related
to the “packing and cracking” integral to gerrymandering, and that avoids the constitution-
ality issue presented by the efficiency gap. In addition, we introduce a generalization of the
efficiency gap that also avoids the equivalency to proportional representation. We apply the
first function to US congressional and state legislative plans from recent decades to identify
candidate gerrymanders.
1 Introduction
To gerrymander is to intentionally choose voting districts so as to actively (dis)advantage one or
more groups1. While gerrymandering can focus on various types of groups, such as incumbents
or those formed by shared race, our focus in this article is the case in which the disadvantaged
group is a political party, that is, partisan gerrymandering.
1There is no universally agreed upon definition. In particular, usage in the courts differs from colloquial usage.
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Approaches towards preventing gerrymanders include vesting the responsibility of drawing
districts in non-partisan commissions (see [Win08]); drawing districts by putatively neutral al-
gorithms (such as the shortest splitline method [KYS07]); or moving away from the current
district-based single member plurality system (see [Gro81] for various alternatives). Since ef-
forts along these lines have not yet eradicated gerrymandering, there is a need for methods that
can accurately identify any gerrymanders that do occur.
Historically, gerrymanders have been identified by unusual district boundaries [Gri]. In fact,
it was the resemblance of a Massachusetts senatorial district to a salamander that gives gerry-
mandering its name (Elbridge Gerry signed off on the district in 1812 while governor of Mas-
sachusetts). To this day, unexpected shapes of districts lead to both zoomorphic comparisons
(e.g., Pennsylvania’s 6th congressional “dragon” district) and allegations of gerrymandering.
In response, a number of researchers have created compactness metrics as a way to help
identify gerrymandered districts (see [NGCH90] for an overview); a recent, related Markov-
chain based approach is found in [CFP17]. While such approaches are important tools, the fact
that partisan asymmetries arise naturally from “human geography” [CR13] strongly suggests
gerrymanders can exist without contorted boundaries. By analogy, just as one can be ill and yet
not have a fever, so can one have a gerrymander without violating compactness.
For more than four decades, vote-distribution asymmetries have been analyzed via the “seat-
votes curve” (see, for example, [Tuf73, GK94, KGC08, Nag15]), the computation of which re-
quires significant statistical assumptions. In 2014, McGhee [McG14] introduced an alternative,
the efficiency gap (see also [MS15]). This function is easily computed from its elegant definition
without any assumptions at all when all races are contested. A short derivation (see [McG14]
or the derivation of equation (6)) shows that a fair district plan according to the efficiency gap
is one in which the seats won and the vote won are proportional with constant 2: Winning 53%
(that is, 50% + 3%) of the vote will earn 56% (that is, 50% + 2 · 3%) of the seats when the
efficiency gap is zero.
As detailed in [MS15, III.C], several decades of court cases predicated on partisan gerry-
mandering have, until recently, been uniformly unsuccessful in the federal courts: On Novem-
ber 21, 2016, a three-member circuit court panel ruled in Whitford v. Gill [Wis] that the dis-
tricts drawn for the Wisconsin lower house are an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This
is the first time such a determination has been made regarding an alleged partisan gerryman-
der [Win16]. A significant part of the panel’s decision relies on the supporting evidence of
asymmetry afforded by the efficiency gap. However, in his dissent in Whitford v. Gill, Chief
Judge Griesbach objects to the reliance on the efficiency gap, in large part on the grounds that
the US Supreme Court has ruled that there is no constitutional right to proportional represen-
tation [Vie]. A natural question is whether there are alternative functions that do not reduce to
proportional representation.
Below we do define a family of functions, indexed by nonnegative numbers τ , that special-
izes to (twice) the efficiency gap when τ = 0. As we’ll describe in Section 4, for τ > 0 these
functions do not reduce to proportionality. However, the focus in this article will be on a new
function for identifying gerrymandering we term the declination. It is a measure of asymmetry
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in the vote distribution that relies only on the fraction of seats each party wins in conjunction
with the aggregate vote each party uses to win those seats. (The declination is essentially an
angle associated to the vote distribution; its name is in analogy with the angular difference
between true north and magnetic north.) The declination does not require the significant statis-
tical assumptions required to compute the seats-votes curve nor the proportional-representation
assumption embedded in the efficiency gap.
To be useful for identifying gerrymanders, our functions must measure asymmetry that
arises from gerrymandering rather than from other sources. Asymmetries that are caused by
partisan gerrymandering arise from two primary techniques. The first is to pack certain districts
with members of party P so that party P wins those districts overwhelmingly, thereby wasting
votes that could have been helpful in winning districts elsewhere. A second technique, naturally
paired with the first, is to crack the party-P voters by distributing them among districts so as
to prevent them from having sufficient power to win elections outside of the packed districts.
Overall, party P wins a small number of overwhelming victories while suffering a large number
of narrow losses. In Theorem 1 we rigorously prove that the declination increases in response
to packing and cracking.
In Section 2 we define the declination and two variations. Analyses of elections in recent
decades using the declination are presented in Section 3. The τ -gap family of functions that
generalizes the efficiency gap is introduced in Section 4. In Section 5 we formally present the
theorem showing that both the declination and the τ -gap increase in response to packing and
cracking. In Section 6 we discuss the relative merits of the declination, the τ -gap, the efficiency
gap and the mean-median. In Section 7 we outline the data sets used as well as the statistical
model used to impute votes in uncontested elections. We conclude in Section 8. Additional
figures and tables are included in the appendix.
2 The declination
Our definition of the declination stems from the observation that in a randomly chosen (i.e.,
ungerrymandered) district plan, the 0.5 threshold for the fraction of democratic votes in a district
does not play a distinguished role. Quirks of geography and sociology will certainly shape
the distribution in various ways that we will not attempt to model. But we expect a phase
shift across the 0.5 threshold no more than we would expect one across 0.4 or 0.56. Partisan
gerrymandering, almost by definition, modifies a natural distribution in a manner that treats the
0.5 threshold as special. Accordingly, one approach to recognizing gerrymanders is to contrast
the set of values below 0.5 with the set of values above 0.5.
In order to compare these two parts of the vote distribution, we introduce some notation:
Define an election with N districts to be a triple E = (P,Q,p) consisting of political parties
P and Q along with a vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) that records the fraction of the two-party
vote won by party P in each of the N districts. We assume, without loss of generality, that our
3
Figure 1: Illustration of the angles θP and θQ arising in the calculation of δ(E) ≈ 0.54 for the
13-district 2014 North Carolina congressional election. Districts have been sorted in increasing
order of democratic vote share.
districts are ordered in increasing order of party-P vote share:
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pk ≤ 1
2
< pk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ pN ≤ 1. (1)
Set k′ = N − k and let A = {(i/N − 1/2N, pi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} and B = {(i/N − 1/2N, pi) :
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. Let F = (k/2N, y¯) and H = (k/N + k′/2N, z¯) be the centers of mass of
the points in A and B, respectively (we therefore assume that k, k′ ≥ 1). Set G = (k/N, 1/2),
T = (0, 1/2) and U = (1, 1/2); see Fig. 1. In a district plan in which neither side has an
inherent advantage, we would expect the point G to lie on the line FH . Deviation of G above
FH is indicative of an advantage for party P while deviation below is indicative of an advantage
for party Q. This suggests, as a measure of partisan asymmetry, the declination, δ(E) = 2(θP −
θQ)/pi, where
θP = ∠HGU = arctan
(
2z¯ − 1
k′/N
)
and θQ = ∠FGT = arctan
(
1− 2y¯
k/N
)
. (2)
Dividing by pi/2 converts from radians to fractions of 90 degrees; possible values of the decli-
nation are between −1 and 1.
To each party we are associating a line whose direction encodes the average vote the party
gets in the districts it wins along with the total number of districts it wins. When a party uses
lots of extra votes to win few districts, the slope of this line is high. The declination, up to the
pi/2-scaling, is the angle between the lines associated to the two parties.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the declination and the efficiency gap evaluate different elections dif-
ferently. In this figure and the remainder of the article, we identify Party P with the Democrats
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and Party Q with the Republicans. As a result, positive values of the declination are favorable
to Republicans.
As illustrated in Figure 3.A, packing or cracking a single district leads to a change of ap-
proximately ±2/N in the declination. Hence, as a measure of the number of seats affected by
the partisan advantage, we also consider δN(E) = δ(E)N/2.
As a second variation, the value of δ˜(E) = δ(E) ln(N)/2 has minimal correlation with N
(see Fig. 3.B) and hence is useful when comparing the declinations of elections with different
numbers of districts.
3 Analyses of elections
Fig. 4 displays the distribution of δ˜ values over time for state legislative (lower house) and
congressional races going back to 1972 (see Section 7 for a detailed description of the data
used). We prove in Theorem 1 that the declination increases (resp., decreases) as a result of
gerrymandering engendered by packing and cracking by party Q (resp., party P ).
There is no gold standard for assessing gerrymandering. As a result, there is no direct way
to validate the declination as a measure of gerrymandering. However, we can still review the
extent to which the declination agrees with other measures of gerrymandering. Table 1 lists the
values of δ˜, δ and δN for congressional races in 2012. There is marked consistency between
the declination and who controlled the redistricting process subsequent to the 2010 census.
Also, while disproportionality may not be sufficient evidence to denounce a district plan as
an unconstitutional gerrymander, a successful gerrymander by definition results in one party
winning fewer seats than it would under a neutral plan. This is consistent with what happened
in the first four states in Table 1 (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia and North Carolina): As noted
in [Wan16], the Democrats earned approximately half the statewide vote in 2012 in each of
these states while garnering no more than 31% of the seats in any of the four.
There is also strong agreement between the declination and compactness metrics (we work
here with δ˜; δ and δN are similarly concurrent). In [Ing14], each 2012 congressional district is
scored by the Polsby-Popper compactness metric (scaled to run from 0 to 100; higher scores
indicate less compact). The nine states with at least eight districts and at least one district
scoring greater than 90 are North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia (the first four listed in
Table 1); California, Illinois and Maryland (three of the last four in Table 1); as well as Florida
and Texas. Intriguingly, the declination identifies Indiana as a likely gerrymander, in contrast to
its evaluation in [Ing14] as a state with very compact districts.
The matter of determining a standard for what qualifies as an unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mander is beyond the scope of this article. (See [MS15] for a comprehensive treatment utilizing
the efficiency gap, [MSK15] for the seats-votes curve and [MB15, Wan16] for the mean-median
difference.) In addition to the nontrivial task of addressing guidance from the courts, two sig-
nificant issues that must be addressed are the reality that any measure of asymmetry in vote
distributions will vary from election to election (see Fig. 5) and that there may be an inherent
5
Figure 2: (A) In the 24-district 1974 Texas congressional elections, the Democrats won approx-
imately 68% of the vote and 87.5% of the seats, yielding an efficiency gap of close to zero.
The declination, however, is strongly negative as a consequence of marked change in slope of
the distribution at 0.5. (B) The vote distribution for the 18-district 2012 Pennsylvania congres-
sional election. The mean district vote fraction for the Democrats is 0.504. Also plotted is the
regression line (slope 0.52, intercept 0.24; r = 0.875, p < 0.001) over all districts. The fact that
it crosses the 0.5 vote threshold approximately five districts earlier than the actual results do is
consistent with δN = 4.8. (C) Hypothetical election results for a district plan with 24 districts
whose democratic vote share ranges from 0.41 in the southwest to 0.67 in the northeast. The
Democrats win 16 seats with a mean vote share of 0.54. (D) The vote distribution from the hy-
pothetical election. The declination is near zero due to the regularity with which the democratic
vote varies among districts. The efficiency gap is far from zero at −0.17 due to the fact that this
election has a constant of proportionality close to one.
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Figure 3: (A) Change in declination relative to fraction of seats packed (California 2012 con-
gressional election) or cracked (Arizona and Georgia 2012 congressional elections). Note that
the elections referenced are used to provide an initial distribution to which packing/cracking is
artificially applied. (B) Plot of N versus |δ˜| for 1 472 legislative and congressional elections.
The regression line is 0.0007N + 0.2011 with an r-value of 0.1769 and p < 0.0001.
partisan asymmetry due to how voters are distributed geographically. We briefly address each
issue.
We consider the first problem by determining how large the declination must be in absolute
value before we are confident that it will not equal zero for a different election in the same
ten-year districting cycle. Figs. 10 and 11 illustrate the total range of δ˜ values for each state
in each redistricting cycle. With respect to our historical data set of 1 195 elections included
in these figures, for over eighty percent of the elections E with |δ˜(E)| > 0.47, the declination
(i.e., the partisan advantage) persists in sign over the course of the entire ten-year redistricting
cycle in which E lies. With this confidence, therefore, we conclude from Table 1 (without
examining data from 2014 or 2016) that the partisan advantage for the congressional district
plans in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, North Carolina, Michigan, Indiana and Maryland are
likely to persist through 2020. We note that the 2012 Wisconsin legislative election, with δ˜ =
0.48, just meets this threshold (also see Fig. 6). For reference, the most extreme values of the
declination for congressional races since 1972 are sorted in Table 2.
The second major issue, inherent partisan advantages arising from how voters are distributed
geographically, is an important one. As explored in [CR13], such realities may lead to one party
naturally garnering more than 55% of the seats with only 50% of the vote. For example, if we
take the republican advantage in Pennsylvania to be 8% (following [CR13]), this seat advantage
translates into a value of δ˜ of approximately 0.23. Since δ˜ = 0.76 > 0.47 + 0.23 for the
2012 Pennsylvania congressional election, we can still conclude with high confidence that the
partisan advantage for the Republicans beyond any geographic advantage will persist through
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Figure 4: Values of δ˜ stratified by year for 461 congressional elections (A) and 606 state
elections (B) with at least eight districts (following [MS15]) and with each party winning at
least one seat. Data for state elections after 2010 not collected. For each heat map, the number
of included elections in a given year varies (for the state elections, states have gradually moved
away from the multi-member districts (see Section 7); for congressional elections there are
sporadic instances in which one party wins all seats).
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Figure 5: Range of δ˜ between 2012 and 2016 for congressional elections. Since Florida’s
congressional districts were changed for the 2016 election, that plan is denoted by FL2 while
the plan in place from 2012–2014 is denoted by FL1. States were omitted if one party won all
seats every year of the cycle.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the declination and (twice) the efficiency gap for 451 state legisla-
tive elections from 1972 to 2010. States with multi-member districts at any time since 1972
are omitted. Declination (rather than δ˜) is used even though we are comparing districts with
different sizes in order to be consistent with the efficiency gap. The correlation is r = 0.76 with
p < 0.001. The three large black circles indicate the Wisconsin elections for 2012, 2014 and
2016.
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Table 1: Values of the declination and its variants for the twenty 2012 US Congressional elec-
tions in states with at least eight districts for which each party won at least one seat. Political
control of the redistricting process taken from [CC16]: R indicates republican control, D in-
dicates democratic control, S indicates split control. Redistricting control in New Jersey and
California was ostensibly non-partisan, but evidence suggests partisan control as indicated,
see [Cai12, PL11] as noted in [CC16]. Voting Rights Act (pre-clearance) states are marked
by an asterisk.
δ˜ δ δN State No. Seats Control
0.76 0.53 4.8 PA 18 R
0.76 0.55 4.4 OH 16 R
0.58 0.48 2.6 VA 11 R*
0.58 0.45 2.9 NC 13 R
0.56 0.43 3.0 MI 14 R
0.49 0.44 2.0 IN 9 R
0.46 0.28 3.8 FL 27 R
0.44 0.24 4.4 TX 36 R*
0.42 0.40 1.6 MO 8 R
0.42 0.38 1.7 TN 9 R
0.35 0.28 1.7 NJ 12 R
0.32 0.31 1.2 WI 8 R
0.28 0.21 1.5 GA 14 R
0.16 0.09 1.3 NY 27 S
0.12 0.11 0.5 MN 8 S
-0.08 -0.07 -0.3 WA 10 S
-0.16 -0.11 -1.0 IL 18 D
-0.19 -0.10 -2.6 CA 53 D
-0.30 -0.27 -1.2 AZ 9 S*
-0.55 -0.53 -2.1 MD 8 D
2020. Ultimately, the proper way to account for any inherent geographic advantages requires
answering the following: To what extent is it constitutional for a district plan to exacerbate (or
mitigate) existing, natural advantages?
Additional summary tables and figures are included in the appendix. Specifically, Tables 3
and 4 list the declination for all 1142 congressional elections and 646 state legislative elections
in the data set. Figs. 8 and 9 depict the actual vote distributions (utilizing imputed vote values
for uncontested races (see Section 7) along with the declination for the 2016 congressional
elections and the 2008 state legislative elections, respectively.
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4 A generalization of the efficiency gap
In this section we introduce a variation on the efficiency gap function. We first review the
definition of the efficiency gap before generalizing it in the next subsection.
McGhee defines a vote as wasted if either 1) it is a vote for the winning candidate in excess
of the one-more-than-50% needed to win the election or 2) it is a vote for the losing candidate.
The motivation for this definition is that packing and cracking produce more wasted votes in
won and lost districts, respectively. In light of this, the difference in the total number of votes
wasted by each party should reflect the extent to which the packing and cracking treats the
parties asymmetrically.
Given an election E = (P,Q,p), party P ’s waste in district i, wP (i), is pi − 1/2 in those
districts it wins and pi in those districts it loses. Party Q’s waste is wQ(i) = 1/2− wP (i).
McGhee [McG14, Eq. (2)] (using different notation and terminology) made the following
definition: The efficiency gap of E is∑N
i=1(wP (i)− wQ(i))
N
. (3)
A positive (resp., negative) efficiency gap indicates that party P (resp., Q) is wasting more
votes. As such, “fair” district plans should have efficiency gaps close to zero.
4.1 The Gapτ function
The efficiency gap takes a binary view of votes: Either a vote contributes to the first 50%
required for a candidate’s win, and is therefore not wasted at all, or it doesn’t contribute, and
is therefore completely wasted. We now explore a more general paradigm in which there is a
continuum of waste that is shaped by a parameter τ .
As motivation for this generalization, consider the party-Q gerrymanderers. They are not
aiming to have the party-P candidates win districts by exactly one vote above 50%. To do so
would skirt disaster. If their projections are even slightly too optimistic, then the gerrymander
will backfire spectacularly with each chosen candidate losing by a razor-thin margin. It is less
reckless for party Q to aim for comfortable margins in each district they aim to win. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to consider the votes just above 50% as only partially wasted while
treating any votes near 100% as almost fully wasted.
For simplicity, we view the votes won by a given candidate as ordered. For a winning
candidate, the first half of the votes in the district contribute directly to the win. The subsequent
votes for the winner, and all votes for the loser, are assigned waste values determined by the
parameter τ . As will become apparent, setting τ = 0 corresponds to weighting all wasted votes
the same amount.
Given an N -district election E , for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , set ai = 2pi− 1. When ai is positive,
party P wins district i and ai is the fraction of the wasted votes that are wasted by P . When
ai is negative, party Q wins district i and −ai measures the fraction of wasted votes wasted by
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party Q. For any nonnegative real number τ and any i > k, we define the τ -waste of party P in
district i to be
wP,τ (i) =
∫ ai
0
xτ dx =
1
τ + 1
aτ+1i . (4)
For i ≤ k, similarly define wQ,τ (i) = (−ai)τ+1/(τ + 1). The remaining values are determined
by requiring that the total waste in each district i, wP,τ (i) + wQ,τ (i), is constant and equal to∫ 1
0
xτ dx = 1/(τ + 1). Set wP,τ =
∑N
i=1wP,τ (i) and wQ,τ =
∑N
i=1wQ,τ (i). Finally, define the
τ -gap of election E to be
Gapτ (E) =
wP,τ − wQ,τ
wP,τ + wQ,τ
. (5)
Note that for any election E , Gap0(E) is twice the efficienct gap.
We now derive a formula for the τ -gap that expresses it in terms of the ai. First we note that
wP,τ =
k∑
i=1
wP,τ (i) +
N∑
i=k+1
wP,τ (i) =
k∑
i=1
(
1
τ + 1
− (−ai)
τ+1
τ + 1
)
+
N∑
i=k+1
aτ+1i
τ + 1
and
wQ,τ =
k∑
i=1
wQ,τ (i) +
N∑
i=k+1
wQ,τ (i) =
k∑
i=1
(−ai)τ+1
τ + 1
+
N∑
i=k+1
(
1
τ + 1
− a
τ+1
i
τ + 1
)
.
Second, wP,τ + wQ,τ = N/(τ + 1). Plugging into equation (5), we find that
Gapτ (E) =
τ + 1
N
(
−
k∑
i=1
2
(−ai)τ+1
τ + 1
+
N∑
i=k+1
2
aτ+1i
τ + 1
+
k − k′
τ + 1
)
= 2
(
−∑ki=1(−ai)τ+1 +∑Ni=k+1 aτ+1i
N
+
1
2
− k
′
N
)
.
It follows that
Gapτ (E) = 2
[∑N
i=1 i(iai)
τ+1
N
+
1
2
− k
′
N
]
, (6)
where i = −1 for i ≤ k and i = 1 for i > k.
We see that Gap0 = 0 precisely when∑N
i=1 ai
N
=
∑N
i=1 2pi − 1
N
=
k′
N
− 1
2
. (7)
Let p¯ denote the overall vote fraction won by party P . Rewriting (7), we find that the efficiency
gap being zero is equivalent to 2(p¯ − 1/2) = k′/N − 1/2. We have recovered the observation
of [McG14, MS15] that the efficiency gap is zero exactly when the excess in fraction of seats
won above one half is twice the excess in vote fraction above one half.
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For general τ , however, the relationship between seats won and votes earned in an election
for which Gapτ is zero is more complicated and depends on how the votes are distributed. When
τ is a nonnegative even integer of the form τ = 2`, we can express the condition succinctly since
then
Gapτ (E) = 2
[
M2`+1(a) +
1
2
− k
′
N
]
, (8)
where M2`+1(a) denotes the (2`+ 1)th moment of the ai.
In the limit as τ → ∞, Gapτ reduces (in the general case of 0 < |ai| < 1 for all i)
to 1 − 2k′/N . It follows that Gap∞ is zero if and only if each party wins half of the seats,
irrespective of overall vote share.
There are at least two natural ways in which the τ -gap could be further generalized. The first
is by allowing the waste to be most pronounced close to the 50% threshold. This is conveniently
attained by considering waste functions of the form (1−ai)−τ for τ < 0. This choice has several
appealing characteristics such as the fact that the winner and loser waste equal amounts more
evenly than the 75%-25% split for the efficiency gap. In addition, the waste function is more
sensitive to what is happening near the 50% threshold. Unfortunately, this latter property seems
to reduce its utility greatly as there is much more noise due to random fluctuations in vote
earned.
Second, while we have restricted our attention to power functions determined by a parameter
τ , the concept of τ -waste could easily be extended to more sophisticated functions. One could
also allow different functions for the votes wasted by the winner and the votes wasted by the
loser.
5 Theorem on packing and cracking
We make precise the link between packing and cracking and the functions we introduce in
the previous two sections. Define P -cracking to be the moving of party-P votes from district
k + 1 to districts 1, 2, . . . , k such that 1) the first k districts are still lost by party P after the
redistribution and 2) district k + 1 becomes a district that party P loses. Similarly, define P -
packing to be the moving of party-P votes from district k + 1 to districts k + 2, k + 3, . . . , N
such that district k + 1 is now lost by party P . Using our new terminology, we state and prove
the following
Theorem 1. Let E = (P,Q,p) be an election with p in weakly increasing order. Let y¯ be the
average party-P vote in the k districts lost by party P and z¯ be the corresponding average in the
k′ districts won by party P . Let p′k+1 be the party-P vote fraction remaining in district k + 1
after P -cracking or P -packing and E ′ the resulting election.
1. If p′k+1 > y¯, then δ(E ′) > δ(E).
2. If p′k+1 > pk, then Gapτ (E ′) > Gapτ (E).
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Proof. Proof of (1). We refer the reader to Fig. 1 for the positions of points referenced. The
P -packing or P -cracking of district k + 1 will move point G to the right by 1/N units. Each
of points F and H will move to the right by only 1/2N units. Since p′k+1 > y¯, point F will
also move up. Since p is arranged in increasing order, point H will also move up. Together,
these shifts will decrease θQ and increase θP , thereby increasing δ. By symmetry, Q-packing
and Q-cracking will decrease δ(E).
Proof of (2). We show only the details for P -cracking; the argument for P -packing is similar.
Let p′ = (p′1, p
′
2, . . . , p
′
N) be the vote distribution for E ′. Since we are P -cracking the (k + 1)st
district, we know that p′i = pi for i > k + 1. Set bi = 2p
′
i − 1 for i ≤ k + 1. Note in the below
equations that all ai and bi for i ≤ k are negative (bk+1 is negative as well). Recall that
Gapτ (E) = 2
[
−∑ki=1(−ai)τ+1 + aτ+1k+1 +∑Ni=k+2 aτ+1i
N
+
1
2
− k
′
N
]
and
Gapτ (E ′) = 2
[
−∑ki=1(−bi)τ+1 − (−bk+1)τ+1 +∑Ni=k+2 aτ+1i
N
+
1
2
− k
′ − 1
N
]
.
We wish to show that the difference
Gapτ (E ′)−Gapτ (E) =
∑k
i=1(−(−bi)τ+1 + (−ai)τ+1)− (−bk+1)τ+1 − aτ+1k+1
N
+
1
N
is positive. Multiplying by N/(τ + 1), we see that this is equivalent to showing that∑k
i=1((−ai)τ+1 − (−bi)τ+1) + 1
τ + 1
≥ (−bk+1)
τ+1 + aτ+1k+1
τ + 1
.
We make the following observations. First, since all votes being moved are going from district
k + 1 to a district i with i ≤ k, we must have∑ki=1((−ai) + bi) = ak+1 − bk+1. Second, since
ak+1 is positive
∑k
i=1((−ai) + bi) ≥ −bk+1. So choose constants 0 = c0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤
ck = −bk+1 such that (−ai) − (−bi) ≥ ci − ci−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Straightforward calculus
shows that, since xτ is an increasing function and −bk+1 ≤ −ai for all i ≤ k by hypothesis,
that ((−ai)τ+1 − (−bi)τ+1) ≥ cτ+1i − cτ+1i−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows that
k∑
i=1
∫ −ai
−bi
xτ dx =
k∑
i=1
((−ai)τ+1 − (−bi)τ+1)
τ + 1
≥ (−bk+1)
τ+1
τ + 1
.
As 1/(τ + 1) ≥ aτ+1k+1/(τ + 1), the result follows.
6 Strengths and weaknesses of different functions
Our situation in identifying gerrymanders is analogous to that of assessing intelligence. Emo-
tional intelligence and logical intelligence are best measured by different types of questions; no
15
single question type can capture the spectrum of ways in which intelligence can manifest itself.
Every test for gerrymandering will have its strengths and weaknesses. In this section we attempt
to illustrate, through concrete examples, ways in which each of the efficiency gap, the τ -gap,
the mean-median difference and the declination can give misleading answers in their attempts
to identify gerrymanders.
The oldest tool for this purpose, the seats-votes curve, has been around for over 40 years [Tuf73].
Notwithstanding its theoretical interest and applications in such areas as predictions (for exam-
ple, [KGC08]), as it has not led to a manageable judicial standard for gerrymandering in this
span, we will not address it directly in the remainder of this article.
6.1 The efficiency gap
The efficiency gap, through its role in Whitford v. Gill, has already proven its utility. And
while its simplicity is an asset, it also has several drawbacks. First, by requiring that there be
proportional representation for an election to be considered fair, it conflicts with constitutional
law [Vie]. Second, it is simple to construct hypothetical examples for which a natural district
plan leads to a constant of proportionality different from 2 (see, for example, Figs. 2.C,D).
While the proportionality asserted by the efficiency gap may hold in some overall sense, for the
instances for which it doesn’t we are left in the difficult position of determining whether any de-
viation from this average law is due to gerrymandering or natural deviation. And, as illustrated
by our definition of the τ -gap function, the proportionality with a constant of 2 depends on a
subjective decision on how to weight various wasted votes. Third, there are historical examples
in which the proportionality holds, but the shape of the vote distribution suggests significant
partisan asymmetry (see, in particular, the 1974 Texas congressional election shown in Fig. 2.A
as well as the 2012–2016 Tennessee congressional elections, the last of which is displayed in
Fig. 8).
6.2 The τ -gap
The τ -gap family of functions is appealing due to its close connection to the efficiency gap and
the fact that it does not reduce to proportionality. Additionally, when τ = 2, the τ -gap is closely
related to skewness of the ai-distribution (see (8)), a standard measure of symmetry in statistical
distributions. We also note that when τ = 2/5, the correlation between the declination and the
τ -gap is very high (r2 = 0.870, p < 0.001 among 461 congressional elections). Unfortunately,
the τ -gap family has its own drawbacks.
First, there is no reason to think that one value of τ will prove superior to other values in all
cases. For example, consider the 1974 Texas and North Carolina congressional elections (see
Fig. 2.A and Fig. 7.A, respectively). Proportionality is essentially met in both cases as reflected
by the values of Gap0 being close to zero; each election is fair according to the efficiency gap. In
contrast, Gap1 is approximately −0.38 for each, indicating strong asymmetry. While we have
no absolute way of determining whether one or both is a gerrymander, evidence suggests that
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Figure 7: (A) Vote distribution for 1974 North Carolina congressional election with Gap0 =
−0.1 and Gap1 = −0.39. (B) Vote distribution for 2006 Tennessee congressional election
illustrating the mean-median difference of -0.13. (C) Vote distrbution for the 2012 Indiana
congressional election showing a mean-median difference of 0.01.
Gap0 makes the correct assessment for the North Carolina election (little or no gerrymandering)
while Gap1 makes the correct assessment for the Texas election (gerrymandering)2. We note
that the declination yields what we believe to be the correct answer in both cases.
Second, even if there were one value of τ that was superior to all others, it is unclear what
theoretical, rather empirical, justification could be used to support it. Third, as shown by (6),
the τ -gap is essentially an interpolation, albeit a complicated one, between the proportionality
with constant 2, when τ = 0, and proportionality with constant 0, when τ =∞. (A fair election
for the latter is one in which each party gets half the seats, regardless of the fraction of votes
won by each side.)
6.3 The mean-median difference
The difference between the mean and the median of the democratic vote fraction among all
districts has been suggested as yet another way of measuring partisan asymmetry (see, for ex-
ample, Wang [Wan16] and [KMM+16, MB15]). A large difference between these values can
indeed accompany an asymmetry in the vote distribution. For example, in the 2012 Pennsylva-
nia congressional election (see Fig. 2.B), the mean is 0.50 while the median is 0.43, a difference
of 0.07. However, the mean-median difference is very sensitive to the vote in a single district
(practically speaking, this is less of an issue in the case of many districts). For example, in the
2006 Tennessee congressional election shown in Fig. 7.B, the difference is -0.13. Had the demo-
cratic support been more unevenly distributed in the districts the Democrats won, the difference
2As described in [O’C90, pg. 35], there was not significant partisan rancor during the 1971 redistricting and the
Democrats received approximately 63% of the congressional vote while winning 82% (9 of 11) congressional seats.
Of course, these facts have little bearing on whether there may have been racial gerrymandering. For the Texas
election, one author [May71] suggests that for the 1965 redistricting, protecting incumbents was a higher priority
than advantaging the Democrats as a party. The constructions of a large number of safe seats for incumbents would
certainly be consistent with the distribution seen.
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would have been much smaller in absolute value. The declination, by relying on averages across
districts rather than values within single districts is more robust in this respect.
Additionally, it is quite possible for packing and cracking to occur without having any effect
on the mean-median difference. For example, consider the 2012 Indiana congressional election
shown in Fig. 7.C. According to the mean-median difference, this is a fair election. However
it is easy to see how less dominant wins in two districts could have translated into one or even
two more seats for the Democrats: such changes need not affect the median.
It is also worth noting that the mean-median difference doesn’t keep track of the number of
seats won by each party. This is probably the main reason it is slightly more stable from election
to election than the efficiency gap or the declination. On the other hand, this independence
makes it harder to interpret the extent to which a particular value of the difference indicates
actual impact on the electoral results.
6.4 The declination
The declination’s primary weaknesses appear to occur when one party wins almost all of the
seats. Fortunately, while gerrymandering may occur in such instances, these are typically not
the cases of greatest interest. In most elections with a large number of seats, the vote fractions
when sorted in increasing order increase essentially linearly except at the extremes. When one
party dominates, this can lead to a declination that is large in absolute value even though the vote
distribution as a whole is remarkably symmetric about the median democratic votes share. This
is the case, for example in the 2008 Rhode Island state legislative election (shown in Fig. 9), in
which the Democrats win two thirds of the vote. On the other hand, when there are few seats
overall, it is not uncommon for one party to win all but one seat. In such a case, the declination
is very sensitive to the exact vote fraction found in that one special district.
7 Data collection and Statistical methods
The US state legislature election data up through 2010 comes from [KBC+11]. We only in-
cluded data on the lower house of the state legislature when two houses exist. The US congres-
sional data through 2014 was provided by [Jac17]. Data on Wisconsin legislative elections from
2012 to 2016 were take from Ballotpedia [Bal17]. Data for 2016 congressional races were taken
from Wikipedia [Wik17] as they were not yet available from the Federal Election Commission.
The election data was analyzed using the python-based SageMath [S+16]. Python packages
employed were pyStan [Tea16] for implementing a multilevel model to impute votes in un-
contested races; Matplotlib [Hun07] and Seaborn [WBH+] for plotting and visualization; and
SciPy [JOP+ ] for statistical methods.
For the state legislative elections, we restricted the analysis to elections that had no multi-
member districts; vote fractions for uncontested races were imputed (i.e., we estimated what
the values would have been had the races been contested).
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Any election (year and state) in which there is at least one multi-member district (i.e., mul-
tiple winners in a single district) was excluded from our analysis. We ignored any third-party
candidates and assumed there to be at most one Democrat and at most one Republican in each
race. All vote percentages assigned to a candidate are therefore percentages of the two-party
vote. We assume all districts have equal population and we do not take into account voter
turnout in any way. Unopposed candidates are allowed. The declination is mildly sensitive to
the vote distribution in each of these uncontested races (see below). Rather than assign 100%
of the vote to the unopposed candidate, which is invariably not reflective of what would have
happened had their been a two-candidate race, we imputed the vote fraction for such races.
Imputation of votes was done using a multilevel model of the form
yi =
1
2
+ σj[i] + φk[j[i]] + γ`[i] + β1W
D
i + β2W
R
i + β3I
D
i + β4I
R
i + i.
Here, yi is the fraction of the vote garnered by the democratic candidate in district i; σj[i] is a
random state effect; φk[j[i]] is a random district effect; γ`[i] is a random year effect; WDi and W
R
i
are indicator variables for whether the democratic or republican candidate won, respectively;
IDi and I
R
i are indicator variables for whether or not the democratic and republican candidates
are incumbents, respectively; β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the corresponding random effects; and i
represents error due to individual characteristics of race i. The model was run separately for
each redistricting cycle (typically of ten years), once for state legislatures and once for the US
House of Representatives. As there are a number of cases in which states underwent major
redistricting mid-decade, certain cycles were split. For example, Texas had one district plan
for its congressional races during the years 1992–1996 and another for 1998–2000. These are
represented in the Figure reffig:congint.C by TX1 and TX2, respectively.
There were 646 state elections in our data with a total of 68 955 races of which 25 371 of
which were uncontested. There were 1 142 congressional elections with a total of 9 995 races
of which 1 409 were uncontested.
When at least one race in a given district had been contested in a given cycle, imputation
is straightforward using the values for the random and fixed effects provided by the model
fit. We cross-validated the estimates by removing individual races, refitting and comparing the
estimated to true values. We found a root mean square error of approximately 0.05 among 100
randomly chosen contested races. We note for comparison that if one uniformly assigns 65%
of the vote to the winner, the error is approximately 0.09.
Of the 26 780 imputed values, there were 114 instances in which the data indicated a demo-
cratic winner, but the imputed value was less than or equal to 0.50. These imputed values were
replaced with 0.505. Similarly, there were 40 instances in which a democratic loser was indi-
cated, but the imputed value was greater than 0.50. These imputed values were replaced with
0.495.
There a number of instances in which a district was not contested at any time during a given
reapportionment cycle. There were 11 770 state legislative district-cycle pairs. Of these, 1 281
were uncontested (i.e., the race in that district was not contested in any year of the cycle). The
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corresponding numbers for congressional elections are 2 030 and 41. For the vast majority of
these cases, one of the two parties held the seat for the entire cycle. For these cases, we drew
from the distribution of district effects stemming from districts that were consistently won by
the same party throughout the cycle (with at least one contested race). There were a total of
19 state district-cycle pairs that were uncontested but held by both parties at some point during
the cycle. The district effect in these cases was drawn at random from all district effects. This
outcome did not occur for the congressional races.
We also performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to the imputed values by introducing
a systemic bias of plus 3% to the democratic imputed votes for congressional elections. We
then performed a linear regression of change in declination with respect to the fraction of races
that had to be imputed. Elections in which one party won all of the seats were omitted. The
slope and r2-value for the regression line was (0.09, 0.76). The corresponding regression line
for state elections was similar, but with a higher r2-value.
For congressional elections with at least eight seats, 53% had at most 10% of the races
uncontested while 90% had at most 40% of the seats uncontested. For state elections, only
31% had less than 10% of the seats uncontested while 92% had less than 65% of the races
uncontested.
8 Conclusion
Among the tests discussed in the previous section, we believe that the declination, on the whole,
possesses the most desirable combination of characteristics. First, it does not reduce to propor-
tionality, and hence is not at odds with constitutional law. Second, it is readily visualized. Third,
the declination is directly computed using fundamental aspects of the election, namely the num-
ber of seats each party wins along with the average vote fraction each earns in those wins. While
the efficiency gap is perhaps even simpler, the general τ -gap is certainly much harder to visual-
ize. Fourth, the declination is relatively robust with respect to the vote fraction in any individual
district, unlike the mean-median difference. The declination also must change in the presence
of packing and cracking, a feature that does not always hold for the mean-median difference.
The declination and compactness metrics are complementary, each captures particular char-
acteristics of gerrymandering. These measures do not capture everything about an election
and one must be careful to not ascribe more importance to a single number than is warranted
(see [O’N16]). Nonetheless, they have utility through their ability to provide a consistent way
to compare elections in different states and years. Assuming the courts ultimately accept one
or more standards for ascertaining whether a district plan amounts to unconstitutional gerry-
mandering, it will be helpful if there is enough flexibility provided so that as our tools and
understanding evolve, so do our classification standards.
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Figure 8: 2016 congressional races with at least one win by each party. Listed in decreasing
order of declination.
23
Figure 9: 2008 state legislative races with at least one win by each party. Listed in decreasing
order of declination.
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Figure 10: Range of δ˜ over each districting cycle for congressional elections: (A) 1972–1980,
(B) 1982–1990, (C) 1992–2000, (D) 2002–2010, (E) 2012–2016. Major redistrictings within
each cycle are indicated by concatenation (e.g., TX1 refers to the district plan in effect at the
beginning of the cycle and TX2 to the next plan). States were omitted if one party won all seats
during the cycle. Subplot (E) is identical to Fig. 5 but is repeated here for comparison with
earlier decades.
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Figure 11: Range of δ˜ over each districting cycle for state legislative elections: (A) 1972–
1980, (B) 1982–1990, (C) 1992–2000, (D) 2002–2010. Major redistrictings within each cycle
are indicated by concatenation (e.g., OH1 refers to the district plan in effect at the beginning of
the cycle and OH2 to the next plan). States were omitted if one party won all seats during the
cycle (or if the plan had multi-member districts).
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Table 2: Most extreme values of δ˜ for congressional elections since 1972.
Most positive δ˜ Most negative δ˜
Year State Seats δ˜ δ δN Year State Seats δ˜ δ δN
1980 VA 10 0.80 0.69 3.5 1976 TX 24 -1.07 -0.67 -8.1
2012 PA 18 0.76 0.53 4.7 1982 TX 27 -0.83 -0.51 -6.8
2012 OH 16 0.76 0.55 4.4 1990 MA 11 -0.82 -0.68 -3.7
2014 NC 13 0.69 0.54 3.5 1988 MA 11 -0.79 -0.66 -3.6
2016 PA 18 0.67 0.47 4.2 1984 MA 11 -0.77 -0.65 -3.5
2012 SC 7 0.63 0.65 2.3 1986 MA 11 -0.77 -0.64 -3.5
2014 PA 18 0.62 0.43 3.9 1972 GA 10 -0.76 -0.66 -3.3
2016 NC 13 0.61 0.48 3.1 1982 MA 11 -0.75 -0.63 -3.5
1972 OH 23 0.61 0.39 4.5 2008 NY 29 -0.74 -0.44 -6.3
2010 AL 7 0.59 0.61 2.1 1978 TX 24 -0.73 -0.46 -5.5
2014 SC 7 0.59 0.60 2.1 1980 TX 24 -0.72 -0.46 -5.5
1994 WA 9 0.58 0.53 2.4 1974 TX 24 -0.71 -0.45 -5.4
2016 TX 36 0.58 0.32 5.8 1972 TX 24 -0.70 -0.44 -5.3
2012 NC 13 0.58 0.45 2.9 1992 TX 30 -0.70 -0.41 -6.1
2012 VA 11 0.58 0.48 2.6 1972 MO 10 -0.69 -0.60 -3.0
1974 OH 23 0.57 0.37 4.2 1992 WA 9 -0.68 -0.62 -2.8
2012 AL 7 0.57 0.59 2.1 2014 MD 8 -0.65 -0.63 -2.5
2016 SC 7 0.56 0.58 2.0 1990 TX 27 -0.63 -0.38 -5.2
2012 MI 14 0.56 0.43 3.0 1978 WA 7 -0.61 -0.63 -2.2
2010 FL 25 0.56 0.35 4.4 1988 TX 27 -0.60 -0.36 -4.9
2002 FL 25 0.56 0.35 4.4 1994 TX 30 -0.59 -0.35 -5.2
2006 VA 11 0.55 0.46 2.5 1976 WA 7 -0.59 -0.60 -2.1
2016 OH 16 0.54 0.39 3.1 1980 MD 8 -0.58 -0.56 -2.2
1994 OK 6 0.54 0.60 1.8 2016 MD 8 -0.58 -0.56 -2.2
2014 OH 16 0.53 0.38 3.1 1980 MA 12 -0.57 -0.46 -2.8
2006 MI 15 0.53 0.39 2.9 2014 CA 53 -0.57 -0.29 -7.6
2004 FL 25 0.52 0.33 4.1 1974 WA 7 -0.56 -0.58 -2.0
2006 OH 18 0.52 0.36 3.3 2012 MD 8 -0.55 -0.53 -2.1
1998 AZ 6 0.52 0.58 1.8 1978 FL 15 -0.54 -0.40 -3.0
2000 AZ 6 0.51 0.57 1.7 1978 OK 6 -0.54 -0.60 -1.8
2010 IL 19 0.51 0.35 3.3 1978 NC 11 -0.54 -0.45 -2.5
2014 MI 14 0.50 0.38 2.7 1980 OK 6 -0.54 -0.60 -1.8
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Table 3: Values of declination for congressional elections. Empty entries are due to one party winning all of the seats.
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
AK
AL 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.07 0.22 -0.25 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.41 -0.02 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.54
AR -0.45 0.33 -0.23 0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.51 -0.38 -0.36 -0.40 0.41 -0.10 -0.17 0.01 -0.38 -0.42 -0.24 -0.21 -0.27 0.19
AZ 0.39 0.42 0.05 -0.16 -0.11 0.01 0.41 0.52 0.45 0.42 -0.16 0.48 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.36 0.43 0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.28 -0.35 0.01
CA 0.05 0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 -0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.14 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.28 -0.10
CO 0.06 0.01 -0.33 -0.24 -0.36 -0.10 -0.04 -0.23 -0.01 0.05 0.28 -0.08 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.17 0.14 -0.18 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.11
CT -0.07 0.15 -0.29 -0.34 -0.15 -0.00 -0.14 0.21 -0.03 -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 0.02 -0.26 0.16 0.30 0.43 0.11
DE
FL -0.35 -0.14 -0.12 -0.40 -0.25 -0.00 -0.28 -0.13 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.06
GA -0.66 -0.15 -0.38 -0.24 -0.23 -0.04 -0.44 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.24 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.07 0.21 0.31 0.36
HI 0.27 0.38
IA 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.43 -0.05 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.15 -0.22 -0.11 -0.41 0.07 0.03 0.06
ID -0.40 -0.27 -0.01 -0.05 -0.43
IL 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.15 -0.14 -0.06 -0.19 -0.20 0.02 -0.02 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.11 0.35 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04
IN 0.04 -0.29 -0.23 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.36 -0.19 -0.12 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.31 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.44 0.21 0.31
KS 0.21 0.18 -0.31 0.51 0.50 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.23 -0.19 -0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.02 -0.25 0.10
KY -0.47 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.19 -0.07 0.03 -0.22 -0.16 -0.12 -0.12 0.23 0.09 0.18 -0.11 0.31 0.04 0.16 -0.26 0.44 0.38 0.36
LA -0.12 0.14 -0.36 -0.13 -0.34 -0.24 -0.35 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.27 0.30 0.31 0.27 -0.03 0.26 0.01 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.41
MA -0.21 -0.41 -0.34 -0.43 -0.48 -0.63 -0.65 -0.64 -0.66 -0.68 0.03 0.05
MD 0.10 0.13 0.24 -0.16 -0.56 -0.37 -0.08 0.07 -0.27 -0.12 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.19 0.26 -0.41 -0.34 -0.18 -0.32 -0.12 -0.53 -0.63 -0.56
ME 0.12 -0.40 -0.06 0.22 0.24 0.02 0.29 0.08
MI 0.26 0.19 0.15 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 0.08 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.12 0.14 0.43 0.38 0.34
MN 0.16 0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.24 -0.02 -0.11 0.15 0.07 -0.26 -0.28 -0.44 -0.25 -0.33 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.21 0.09 0.11 -0.12 -0.09
MO -0.60 -0.01 -0.32 -0.17 -0.02 0.12 -0.28 0.14 0.13 0.01 -0.09 -0.29 0.10 -0.06 0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.40 0.25 0.33
MS 0.27 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.55 0.02 -0.38 0.01 -0.07 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 0.11 -0.24 0.33 0.36 0.25 0.33
MT 0.42 0.24 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.19 0.12 -0.04
NC -0.16 -0.05 -0.16 -0.45 -0.01 -0.36 0.08 0.06 -0.32 -0.09 -0.25 0.07 -0.13 -0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.25 0.45 0.54 0.48
ND
NE -0.23 -0.24 -0.36 0.13 -0.24 -0.30
NH -0.28 0.16 -0.10 -0.07 -0.31 -0.07 0.17 0.08
NJ -0.03 -0.18 -0.27 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.15 -0.19 -0.10 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.22 0.06 -0.01 0.28 0.17 0.07
NM 0.32 0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.36 0.05 0.28 0.44 0.30 0.37 0.12 0.38 0.08 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.53 -0.11 -0.11 -0.27 -0.17
NV 0.00 -0.31 -0.08 0.14 0.01 0.20 -0.27 -0.31 -0.13 0.27 0.48 0.01 0.28 0.06 0.24 -0.35
NY -0.00 -0.05 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 0.08 -0.00 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.06 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.08 -0.44 -0.00 0.09 -0.03 0.14
OH 0.39 0.37 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.20 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.01 0.28 0.55 0.38 0.39
OK -0.53 0.16 -0.61 -0.60 -0.46 -0.59 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.19 0.60 0.21 0.55 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.08
OR 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.22 -0.43 -0.41 0.12 -0.39 -0.39 -0.52 -0.53 -0.55 -0.46 -0.44 -0.60 -0.48 -0.51 -0.53
PA -0.08 0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.00 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.53 0.43 0.47
RI 0.26 0.13 0.01 -0.27 0.09 0.00
SC 0.01 -0.24 -0.27 0.10 0.22 0.05 -0.01 0.19 -0.06 -0.14 0.07 -0.00 0.13 0.27 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.46 0.65 0.60 0.58
SD 0.13 -0.15 0.15
TN 0.27 -0.11 -0.02 -0.23 -0.18 -0.10 -0.34 -0.27 -0.29 -0.25 -0.30 -0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.18 -0.13 -0.02 -0.13 0.29 0.38 0.34 0.34
TX -0.44 -0.45 -0.67 -0.46 -0.46 -0.47 -0.20 -0.14 -0.37 -0.39 -0.41 -0.35 -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 -0.20 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.32
UT 0.06 -0.26 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.43 0.14 -0.02 -0.28 -0.10 0.09 0.12 -0.32 -0.33
VA 0.35 0.19 0.23 -0.04 0.58 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.17 -0.21 -0.05 -0.08 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.46 -0.03 0.27 0.48 0.32 0.21
VT
WA 0.22 -0.58 -0.60 -0.63 -0.45 -0.16 -0.10 0.02 -0.16 -0.06 -0.62 0.53 0.42 -0.03 -0.16 -0.23 0.02 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04
WI 0.16 -0.15 -0.33 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 -0.22 -0.12 -0.16 0.16 0.10 0.00 -0.18 -0.02 -0.18 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.14 0.07 0.31 0.19 0.20
WV 0.32 0.28 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.14
WY
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Table 4: Values of declination for state lower house elections. Empty entries are due to one party winning all of the seats or
to the election containing multi-member districts.
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
AK 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.06 -0.16
AL -0.61 -0.50 -0.40 -0.33 -0.15 -0.15 -0.06 0.01
AR -0.18 -0.25 -0.20 -0.16 -0.10
AZ
CA -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.11 -0.04 -0.14 -0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.07
CO 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.30 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
CT 0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 0.17 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10
DE 0.04 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.10 -0.23 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.27 -0.00 -0.14
FL -0.16 -0.20 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.21
GA -0.19 -0.18 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.05
HI -0.32 -0.22 -0.25 -0.43 -0.29 -0.66 -0.54 -0.30 -0.25 0.01 -0.18 -0.37 -0.31 -0.46 -0.38
IA 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.02
ID
IL -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.00
IN -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.01
KS 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.06 -0.00 0.09 0.07 0.10 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.14
KY -0.30 -0.20 -0.26 -0.17 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.14
LA -0.36
MA -0.19 -0.26 -0.26 -0.28 -0.34 -0.32 -0.29 -0.33 -0.23 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 -0.24 -0.33 -0.37 -0.41 -0.37 -0.50 -0.20
MD
ME 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.02
MI -0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.19
MN -0.20 -0.19 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.25 0.15 0.02 -0.01 0.13
MO 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.19 -0.18 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.09
MS
MT -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07
NC 0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.00
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM -0.32 -0.16 -0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.20 -0.23 -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.05
NV 0.09 -0.24 -0.47 0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.15 -0.25 -0.32 -0.00 -0.26 0.01 -0.12 -0.24 -0.21 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08
NY 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.04 -0.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.00
OH -0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.09 0.14
OK -0.19 -0.21 -0.32 -0.23 -0.24 -0.27 -0.24 -0.18 -0.19 -0.11 -0.22 -0.24 -0.21 -0.10 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.16
OR 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.01
PA 0.02 0.10 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.03
RI -0.10 -0.10 -0.22 -0.27 -0.18 -0.32 -0.23 -0.26 -0.28 -0.38 -0.16 -0.38 -0.25 -0.37 -0.23 -0.36 -0.16 -0.04 -0.35 -0.33
SC -0.26 -0.46 -0.39 -0.43 -0.36 -0.40 -0.19 -0.18 -0.09 -0.14 -0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.05
SD
TN -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.18 -0.25 -0.16 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.11
TX -0.53 -0.52 -0.31 -0.30 -0.22 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 -0.24 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.05
UT 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.15
VA
VT
WA
WI -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.03
WV
WY 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.26
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